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RECENT CASES
LIABILITY FOR INJURY CAUSED BY DEFECT IN ARTICLE SOLD-FORM OF ACTION
-PERSONS
LIABLE-PROCESSOR AND RETAILER LIABLE IN ASSUMPSIT FOR
ILLNESS CAUSED BY INFECTED FOOD

Plaintiff became ill with trichinosis from eating contaminated pork which was
purchased from the defendant retailer, wvho had bought the pork from the defendant packer. Action in assumpsit for breach of warranty was brought by the
plaintiff against both the packer and retailer. Held, both packer and retailer are
liable in assumpsit. Simone v. John 1.Felin and Co. et al, 35 Pa. D. & C. 645

(1939).
The question of the liability of the manufacturer or packer of food products
to an ultimate consumer who is injured by reason of the unwholesom'eness of such
products has been answered by the courts in various ways, many of which have
led to confusion and have left in doubt the actual basis for the decisions. Although
the liability of the manufacturer or packer in such cases is generally recognized,
the courts are not agreed upon the principle upon which such liability rests, that
is, whether it may be founded upon an implied warranty or must be founded upon
negligence.
There seems to be no doubt that an action on the tort will lie. The rule is
that every manufacturer of foodstuffs is under a duty to a purchaser to use reasonable care to make and sell only wholesome foodstuffs. Rozumailski v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 296 Pa. 114, 145 Atl. 700 (1929); Menaker et al. v.
Supblee-Wills-lones Milk Co., 125 Pa. Super. 76, 189 Atl. 714 (1937).
This tort duty developed as one of the exceptions to the rule in the case of
Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109 (1842), that the manufacturer, contractor, or vendor of a chattel owed a duty of care only to the persons or persons
with whom he contracted. In the case of Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397
(1852), the duty of due care for the safety and protection of the ultimate consumer where the article manufactured was inherently dangerous to human life even
if correctly made was imposed. This was expanded into a duty to use care for
the protection of the ultimate consumer with respect to all articles designed to
affect, preserve, or destroy human life. Birmingham Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Clark, 205 Ala. 678, 89 So. 64 (1921).
In Pennsylvania, prior to the instant case, the courts sometimes based recovery
in the trespass cases upon the theory of a breach of warranty while the assumpsit
actions have occasionally been sustained upon the grounds of negligence. Thus
there was considerable conflict in authority as to whether the action should be in
trespass for the tort or in assumpsit for breach of an implied warranty. The instant
case definitely decides that the ultimate consumer may sue the manufacturer either
in trespass or in assumpsit. There is respectable authority to the effect that a
manufacturer or packer of unwholesome or impure foods or beverages may be
liable to an ultimate consumer who has been injured thereby, upon the theory of
implied warranty of wholesomeness notwithstanding the absence of any privity
of contract. Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co. 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382
(1920); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N. E. 557
(1928); Madouros v. Kansas City Cora-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275,
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90 S. W. (2d) 445 (1936); Mazetti v. Armour and Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac.
633 (1913).
There are several theories used by the courts to avoid the fact that there is
no privity of contract between the manufacturer and consumer where there is aft
intervening middleman. In the case of Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, supra, the
court said that since it was known to the Baking Company that the dealer did not
purchase for his own consumption, the implied warranty was a contract entered
into for the benefit of a third party, the ultimate consumer. It is interesting to
note that there is such a suggestion in the instant case.
It is evident that whatever method the court uses to impose liability upon the
manufacturer is incidental to'actual allowance of recovery. The court in the instant
case recognizes that this is a civil wrong for which damages should be given irrespective of the absence of privity of contract when it quotes the dictum of Mr.
Justice Frazer in Catani v. Swift and Co., 251 Pa. 52, 57, 95 At. 931 (1915):
"The remedies of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend
upon the intricacies of thL law of sales. The obligation of the manufacturer should not be based alone upon privity of contract. It should
rest, as was once said, upon 'the demands of social justice'."
F. H.

TORTS--ACTIONS

FOR WRONGFUL

DEATH-PARTIES-RECOVERY

BY MINOR

FROM MOTHER FOR WRONGFUL DEATH OF FATHER

A minor brought an action by his mother, as next friend, against his mother
to recover damages for the death of his father, who was killed by the mother's
allegedly negligent driving of an automobile. Held, unemancipated child could
sue its parent, and recover damages under the Wrongful Death Statute. Minkin
v. Minkin, 336 Pa. 49, 7 A. (2d) 461 (1939).
The Supreme Court based its decision on the theory that the Wrongful Death
Statutes in effect supplant former public policy that an unemancipated minor cannot sue his parent, and that the mother is not really suing herself, inasmuch as she
is suing in a representative capacity on the minor's behalf.
The question raised in this case was, whether the relationship between parent
and child precluding suits by the child against the parent for bodily injury has
the same effect when the injury is indirect. In Wilson v. Barton, 153 Tenn. 250, 283
S. W. 71 (1925), recovery was denied on the round that the statutory action is
derivative, and since the deceased parent, had he lived, could not have sued the
surviving parent, then children or next of kin of the deceased parent could not sue
the surviving parents. See to the same effect Wilson v. Brown, (Tex. Civ. App.)
154 S. W. 322 (1913); Damiano v. Damiano, 6 N. J. Mis. R. 849, 143 Atf. 3
(1928); Re Dolmage, 203 Ia. 231, 212 N. W. 553 (1927).
That difficulty is obviated in Pennsylvania by a different construction as to
derivation. The Acts of April 15, 1851, P. L. 669, sec. 19, 12 Purd. Stats. (Pa.)
§ 1601, and April 26, 1855, P. L. 309, as amended, 12 Purd. Stats. (Pa.) § 1602,
are construed as providing derivative causes of action, but the derivation is from
the tortious acts and not from the person of the deceased, so that the cause of action
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comes to the parties named in the statute free from any personal difficulties arising
from the relationship between the injured party and the tortfeasor. Kaczorows i
v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438 AtI. 663 (1936). Therefore in the instant case, the
fact that the father, had he lived, could not sue the mother, even since the Married
Woman's Act, (Gillan v. West, 232 Pa. 74, 81 Atd. 128 (1911); Miller v. Miller,
44 Pa. 170 (1863),) does not affect the minor's right.
But at common law, a minor could not sue his parent, and vice versa, as a
matter of public policy, where a personal tort was involved. Luster v. Luster, 13
N. E. (2d) 438 (Mass. 1938). In the instant case, the injury is an indirect
tort. In Munster v. Farmer'sMut. Auto Ins. Co., 281 N. W. 671 (Wis. 1938),
a father was allowed to recover for an indirect tort from his unemancipated son,
the court construing the Death Statutes as impliedly allowing such suit, whatever
may be the rule as to actions for personal injury between parent and child.
In the instant case too, the common law doctrine is held to be displaced by
the statute. Northern Central Ry. Co. v. Walworth, 193 Pa. 207, 44 Atl. 253
(1899).
But although the minor was allowed to recover, the mother was not
allowed to share in the proceeds, the court basing this rule on the common law
theory that no one can profit from his own wrong. Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo.
621, 108 S. W. 641 (1908). It seems the more logical and facile procedure would
be to consider the minor's action as one to recover a property loss, i. e. loss of
father's support, in which case there are no objections to a suit between an un,emancipated minor and his parent. 46 C. J. 1324; State ex rel. Festor v. Stead,
143 Mo. 248, 45 S. W. 50 (1898).

J. G. T.

PRACTICE-STRIKING OUT OF DICTUM

Judgment was rendered against plaintiff by a federal district court. He appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the trial
court in an opinion which included dictum. Plaintiff, feeling that this dictum
would be prejudicial to another action which was then pending in a state court,
moved to have it expunged from the court's opinion as an incident to a motion
for a rehearing. Held, the court granted the request to strike out the dictum
though the rehearing was denied. Flewellen et al v. Logan et al, 106 F. (2d,)
151 (C. C. A. 5th. 1939).

A result contrary to that of the instant case was reached in Van Gorden v.
Schuller et al, 192 Iowa 853, 185 N. W. 604 (1921). There, unnecessary findings which plaintiff felt would prejudice his action at law against the all'eged agent
of the defendants were included in the opinion of the trial court. Plaintiffappealed to the upper court, which denied him relief on the grounds that no appeal
would lie for errors in the opinion since the opinion is not an essential part of
the decree. Plaintiff having consented to the decree below was held to have
waived his right to appeal.
There are few cases involving such a request. Many courts have stated the
rule that no appeal will lie for errors in the court's opinion nor for errors in the
court's reasoning by which a certain result was reached. Rudman et ux. v. City
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of Scranton et at, 114 Pa. Super. 148, 173 At. 892 (1934); Clegg v. Seaboard
Steel Casting Co.,, 34 Pa. Super. 63 (1907); Stoody Co. v. Mills Alloys, 67 F.
(2d.) 807 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933) and others. But cf, Houston v. Williams, 13
Cal. 24 (1859), suggesting that a court's opinion may be attacked through "regular proceedings, ' though there was no intimation as to the character of such proceedings. In all these cases, however, the real question involved was the reversal
of judgment for errors in the'court's opinion, a question not involved in the instant
case.
There are cases in which the courts have modified their opinions. An opinion
may be modified to explain its meaning where the original opinion might lead
to confusion. State ex rel. Hill v. Port of Seattle et a], 104 Wash 634, 180 Pac.
137 ( 1919). A court has inherent power to either modify or withdraw an opinion
at any time so long as it retains jurisdiction of the case. Lynn v. Schirber, 45
S. D. 10, 186 N. W. 570 (1922). When an error in the court's opinion is called
to its attention, it will modify by deleting certain language and substituting other.
Paul v. Paul, 121 Kan. 363, 245 Pac. 1022 (1926). Under its rules of court
providing that opinions shall not be given out for publication until the petition
for rehearing is disposed of, the court may correct and reform the original opinion
when necessary to correct errors, rather than hand down a new opinion. Schrodt's
ex'r. v. Schrodt, 189 Ky. 457, 225 S. W. 151 (1920).
An addition of findings
may bc made to the court's opinion in denying a motion for a rehearing. Williami
v. Costa et ux, 73 Pac. (2d.) 926 (Cal. 1937). Striking a statement from an
opinion does not mean that relief will not be granted on that issue by the trial
court but merely that that issue was not involved in the appeal. Eisenberg et al.
v. Superior Court, 193 Cal. 575, 226 Pac. 617 (1924). It can be concluded from
these cases that the powers of courts to alter opinions are broad. The questions
then remain whether the petitioner can show just cause in seeking to strike out
dictum to move the court to exercise its powers and what procedure he must adopt.
The form of an opinion cannot be the cause for its modification. Smith et
al. v. Rathbun et al, 88 N. Y. 661 (1882). Unnecessary comment on evidence
might be considered just cause for modification where there was pending another
distinct through related action. Higdon v. State, 25 Ala. App. 204, 143 So. 211
(1932). But cf. Van Gorden v. Schuller et al, 192 Iowa 853, 185 N. W. 604
1921) supra. A wide application of the principle of the instant case might be
made in those cases which are appealed to a higher court upon a rule to show
cause and the appellate court in handing down its opinion inserts dictum which
might be prejudicial to either party in the case.
As to the correct procedure to be employed, where a rehearing is desired, the
request made incident thereto would seem proper as illustrated in the instant case.
Rsule 84, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules, on Petitions for Rearguments reads,
"Petitions for rearguments .....
.must specify particularly the point supposed to
have been overlooked or misapprehended by the court ....
the reasons for a
rehearing .... . This language ma possibly afford the same remedy in Pennsylvania. This was done in Phila. v. Jewell, 2 Mon. (Pa.) 734 affirming 135 Pa'
329, 20 At. 281 when in a petition for a rehearing counsel's brief indicated an
error in the opinion though no actual request was made for modification.
For the petitioner seeking such relief, the questions of what amounts to just
cause and of procedure remain unanswered, but the instant case will possibly lend
some encouragement.
P. S. D.

